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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES IN MARYLAND
AND THEIR ANNULMENT
By JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.*
The essential task of this article will be to classify in-
valid or defective marriages in Maryland into those which
are totally void and hence subject to collateral attack and
those which are only voidable by appropriate steps of di-
rect attack taken during the joint lifetime of the spouses.'
But, as investigation of this question requires a survey
of all the local law concerning the requirements of and im-
pediments to a valid marriage, and, as well, an inquiry
into the procedural aspects of annulment, the article will
be, in effect, one on the broader questions of validity of
marriage and annulment in Maryland.
TE GENERAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTAL VOIDNESS
AND VOIDABILITY
Terminology presents the first problem. The phrase
"totally void" will be used herein to express the idea of
a marriage's possessing some defect rendering it suscept-
ible to collateral attack, even after the death of one or both
of the spouses. For such marriages no direct step or pro-
ceeding to annul is necessary, although the latter may be
desirable. "Voidable" will be used to express the idea
that the defect, at most, permits the validity of the mar-
riage to be directly attacked by appropriate steps during
the joint lifetime of the spouses, although without that
the invalidity may not be asserted collaterally in any other
proceeding. "Valid" and "completely valid" will be used
interchangeably in the sense that the marriage meets all
the requirements and encounters none of the impediments
so that it can withstand both direct and collateral attack.
* A. B., 1922, St. John's College; LL. B., 19257, Washington and Lee Uni-
versity; S. J. D., 1926, Harvard Law School; J. S. D., 1931, Yale Law
School. Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Faculty
Editor of the REvIEw.
1 See, for an interesting historical discussion of the difference between
direct and collateral attack, Fornshill v. Murray, 1 B1. 479, 482-4 (1828).
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In addition to the question of total voidness or mere
voidability, there must be considered whether, if the mar-
riage be only voidable, it may be avoided by simple private
act, or a judicial proceeding is necessary. Related to this
is the matter of ratification, which is possible for some,
though not all, voidable marriages2 and which is consid-
ered by some writers to be possible for certain marriages
which are otherwise totally void. Whether such a latter
class exists in Maryland law will be one of the inquiries
of this article.' A certain confusion exists between a mar-
riage's being totally void although capable of ratification,
and its being voidable by private act without judicial pro-
ceeding.
Granting that ratification is possible, what conduct ac-
complishes it?' The most typical form recognized is in-
dulgence in marital relations at a time when the impedi-
ment fact has been removed (insanity, intoxication, and
duress), or is known to the one entitled to avail of it
(fraud), or the "age of consent" had been reached (non-
age).
Other conduct may suffice. Express assent, or assent
implied from other conduct than marital relations may
equal the latter if given or performed under the same cir-
cumstances. "Sleeping on one's rights" too long may,
by the general equitable principle of laches, be as effectual
as marital relations to ratify where ratification is possible.
Waiver and estoppel must also be considered. The fail-
ure to take steps to avoid a voidable marriage before the
death of one of the spouses would be substantially a ratifi-
cation, although it is rarely thought of as such.
What of the legitimacy of the offspring of either a to-
tally void marriage or a voidable one which has been prop-
erly avoided? The rule is that such children are illegiti-
mate. One of the effects of total voidness is that illegiti-
2 The only type of "voidable" marriage which, under Maryland law, is
incapable of ratification, is a marriage in one of the prohibited relationships.
See Infra, circa note 72.
' See a dictum concerning this in Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison, 22
Md. 468, 489. 85 Am. Dec. 658 (1864).
' On ratification, see Jones v. Jones. 36 Md. 447, 455-7, 11 Am. Rep. 505
(1S72).
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macy may be asserted in any proceeding in which it is rele-
vant. One of the results of avoiding a voidable marriage
is the declaration that the marriage really never existed
and that the offspring are bastardized nunc pro tunc.5
Some states, by statute, have attempted to ameliorate
this unfortunate situation by legislative declaration of the
legitimacy of the offspring of defective marriages.6 Mary-
land has no such provision although one of our statutes
does give the delusive appearance of attempting this ob-
jective. This is the a vinculo divorce statuteT which, in
addition to providing our three supervenient grounds8 for
absolute divorce, also includes three pre-ven~ent grounds.
These latter are impotence, the pre-marital unchastity of
the wife, and that the marriage was null and void ab initio.
The granting of divorces for these grounds really involves
granting, in the name of divorce, what are substantially
annulments.
At first sight this statute seems to attempt to preserve
the legitimacy of the offspring of the marriages involved.
But analysis discloses that this could hardly be so, al-
though to date there has been no interpretation of the
point by the Court of Appeals. In the case of impotence
there can be no offspring to have their legitimacy saved.
It is arguable that there could hardly be any motive to
preserve it for the offspring of a woman who, by her pre-
marital unchastity, has manifested a promiscuity which
casts doubt on the paternity of her children born after
marriage.9 And, if "marriage null and void ab initio'"
means (as the writer believes it to mean) only totally void
IHarlan, Law of Domestic Relations in Maryland (1909) 36. But see
the dissenting opinion in Lurz v. Lurz, 170 Md. 428, 432, 438-9, 154 AtI. 906,
185 At. 676 (1936), where it is indicated that the offspring of a voidable
marriage, born before the proceeding, are legitimate. For a note on the
Lurz case, see (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 348.
a Some states provide for a type of annulment the effect of which is to
annul the marriage from and after the date of the proceeding. Maryland
has no such provision, although the divorce method may have been calcu-
lated to afford one.
7Md. Code, Art 16, Sec. 38, as amended, Md. Acts 1937, Ch. 396.
1 Viz., adultery, three years abandonment, and five years voluntary sepa-
ration, the last named of which was added in 1937.
' The text statement to which this footnote is appended is obviously an
attempted rationalization of the pre-marital unchastity ground, the desir-
ability of which is another matter.
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and does not include also marriages merely voidable, could
not collateral attack on the legitimacy of the offspring still
be made, even though the parents were divorced? Only
if the legislature intended such a divorce to preclude later
collateral attack on the marriage would the statute have
the effect of preserving legitimacy. That remains to be
seen if and when the Court ever has a case in point. 0
It is conceivable, of course, that the Court will both
interpret the pre-venient divorce statute to preserve the
legitimacy of the offspring of the marriages coming there-
under, and to make "void ab initio" include iot only totally
void marriages but also merely voidable ones. Doing this
would provide Maryland with a device for preserving the
legitimacy of the offspring of defective marriages and with
a generally applicable annulment procedure which would
serve to terminate the defective marriages only as of the
date of proceeding. Such an interpretation would do no
more violence to language than has already been done in
the instances to be discussed below of decisions reached
in order to preserve legitimacy. It would serve to permit
the party entitled to an annulment to ratify the marriage
for the limited purpose of preserving legitimacy without
totally ratifying it so as to debar him from his right to
terminate.
The matter of legitimacy bulks large on the instant
question of total voidness or voidability. The writer be-
lieves that the judicial inclination to uphold marriage and
legitimacy1 partly explains some Maryland rulings"2 which
have seemingly preferred the result of "voidable" instead
of "totally void". This general judicial bent in favor of
marriage and legitimacy underlies many other rules dealing
with marriage, particularly those conce(ning proof of mar-
10 Harlan, toc. cit. supra note 5, states that the issue are bastardized even
when a divorce is granted for the ground of marriage void ab initio.
11In Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 337, 68 AtI. 561, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1180 (1908), the Court referred to the Harrison case, Supra note 3, as show-
ing the anxiety of the Court to avoid illegitimacy by finding marriages to
be voidable rather than totally void.
12 Viz., the rulings in the cases of uncle and niece marriages, and the mar-
riages of lunatics not under adjudication. Consider also the problem of
the remarriage of the guilty party to a divorce who is prohibited to re-
marry. All of these will later be discussed.
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riage and of capacity to marry.18 Holding (after one
spouse is dead) that the marriage, at worst, ws only void-
able and that it is now too late to attack it, is a very apt
judicial device for preventing the unfortunate consequence
of branding the cohabitation as sinful and the offspring
thereof as bastards.
Another general consideration which seems important
is the analogy between the task of deciding either total
voidness or voidability for marriages performed locally,
and that of deciding whether to recognize as valid mar-
riages which were valid where performed, but which would
not have been if performed in Maryland. Thus the Mary-
land Court has indicated acceptance of the exception to the
general Conflict of Laws rule of "valid where performed,
valid everywhere" for those foreign marriages not only
contrary to our local rules but also offensive to our strong
public policy. Would not the Maryland Court's recogni-
tion that a given type of foreign marriage does so offend
our strong public policy be ipso facto a ruling that the local
prohibition was meant to make such marriages totally void?
* Should not the same answer be given for poth problems 114
Then, if the Court of Appeals ever has to interpret the
"void ab initio" ground for absolute divorce (assuming
that this means "totally void"), further light may be
thrown on the general question of what marriages are
totally void and what ones voidable. 5
13 Viz., the presumption of ceremonial marriage from cohabitation and
repute, the rule of strict proof of an impediment first marriage which would
render a later one bigamous, and the presumption of capacity to marry at
the time of a later marriage, all later to be discussed.
"In Fensterwald v. Burke, 129 Md. 131, 98 AtI. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562(191(y), the-Court relied on an earlier ruling that an uncle-niece marriage
was only voidable, Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison, 8upra note 3, as a
precedent for finding that such a marriage did not come within the public
policy exception.
1' In Dimpfel v. Wilson, supra note 11, 107 Md. 329, 336, the Court said,
with reference to the District of Columbia statute setting up pre-venlent
grounds for divorce: "It is one thing to prohibit a marriage and declare
it null and void if made under certain conditions, and quite another to
authorize a divorce-thereby making it voidable only and not ab nitio void."
Of course this would indicate that, in Maryland, impotence and pre-marital
unchastity render marriages only voidable, but it could hardly cover the
ground expressly stated to be "void ab initio." In the Harrison case, supra
note 3, 22 Md. 468, 48.5, the Court (in another connection) used "void ab
initio" as meaning what is here understood as "totally void."
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Square rulings on the question of total voidness or mere
voidability come, of course, only in cases where collateral
attack on the marriage is attempted. Such a decision is
unnecessary in a direct proceeding to annul, which may be
brought either to accomplish the undoing of a marriage
which is voidable only and in need of such proceeding or to
serve as a declaratory judgment of the total voidness of a
marriage which could be collaterally attacked.
THE REQuIEMENTS OF AND IMPEDIMENTS TO A
VALID MARRIAGE.
A valid marriage results whenever a man and a
woman engage in activity which by the law of the place
where it occurs is recognized as making them husband
and wife. There must be certain conduct engaged in by
competent parties under circumstances whereby they in-
tend matrimony and both understandingly and freely con-
sent to acquiring that status. The italicized words indi-
cate the ensuing sub-divisions to be: (1) Conflict of laws;
(2) Formalities; (3) Competency of parties; and, (4) In-
tention and consent. Under each will be discussed the de-
tails of the rule, total voidness or voidability, and the
proper procedure for annulment.16
(1) Conflict of Laws.
Conflict of Laws problems arise when the law of the
state of celebration is such that the marriage, valid where
performed, would not have been valid had the conduct oc-
curred in Maryland, either because the formalities else-
where allowed do not meet Maryland standards, or be-
cause the rules of competency are laxer.17 With respect
to those marriages which would not have been valid if
locally performed the rule is to recognize them if valid
16 The last general heading of this article will be devoted to a compara-
tive treatment of the different annulment procedures available in Mary-
land.
17 Conflict of Laws problems of marriage usually concern either forms of
solemnization or competency of parties. Rarely are there sufficient dif-
ferences involving the contract impediments to create problems therefor.
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where performed' s unless doing so would run counter to
the strong public policy of Maryland.
Differences in the requirement of formality of mar-
riage have been held not to violate public policy, so that
we have recognized marriages from other jurisdictions
entered into either by non-religious ceremonies 19 there
provided for, or by simple contract 20 there permitted.
It is in connection with certain aspects of the com-
petency of parties that our Court has intimated it would
apply the exception rather than the general rule in a suf-
ficiently serious case. By a strong dictum in Jackson v.
Jackson2l the Court indicated that marriages "which are
deemed contrary to the law of nature as generally recog-
nized in Christian countries . . . (and those) . . . which
the local law making power has declared shall not be al-
lowed any validity" would not be recognized in Mary-
land even though valid where performed. It was indi-
cated that this includes polygamous marriages; incestu-
ous marriages involving brother and sister or direct as-
cendants and descendants (if such should anywhere be
allowed); and marriages between persons of different
races prohibited to intermarry in Maryland.
With reference to other prohibited degrees of rela-
tionship we must consider Fensterwald v. Burk2 where
an uncle and niece, forbidden to marry by Maryland law,
left Maryland and were married in a jurisdiction per-
mitting such marriages under the particular circum-
11 See Fornshill v. Murray, supra note 1, 1 Bi. 479, 485; and Corrie's Case,
2 Bi. 488, 499 (1830). Both recognize the general principle.19 Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 191, 30 Atl. 752 (1894); Jackson v.
Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 30, 33 Atl. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773 (1895); Glaser V.
Dambmann, 82 Md. 643, 32 Atl. 522 (1895) ; Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md.
93, 98 (1873) ; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251, 298 (1875), where the Court
found insufficient proof of a marriage before a Justice of the Peace in
Arkansas; and Hanon v. State, 63 Md. 123 (1885), where it was held that
testimony to the fact of marriage by a Justice of the Peace in Pennsyl-
vania would be sufficient even without proof of the authority of such an
official to perform marriages there.
20 Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, 156 Md. 610, 145 Atl. 204 (1929), where, on
conflicting proof, the Court (three dissenting) found a simple contract
marriage to have been entered into in New York by writing in a prayer
book, and that such conduct created marriage under the then New York law.
Supra note 19, 82 Md. 17, 29-30. The same dictum is quoted with ap-
proval in Fensterwald v. Burke, aupra note 14, 129 Md. 131, 137.
2 Supra note 14.
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stances. The case apparently recognized the validity of
the marriage. The inference from the Jackson and Fen-
sterwald cases is that all other less obnoxious prohibited
degrees of relationship (all the affinity ones) would also
come within.the general rule rather than the exception so
that if the marriage was valid where celebrated it will be
held valid in Maryland.
While the language of the Fensterwald case recog-
nized the complete validity of the marriage as created
by the foreign law2" yet its reliance on the Harrison case2
creates some doubt whether the decision was for the com-
plete validity of the foreign marriage or its being, at
most, one only voidable during the joint lifetime, while the
avoiding had not happened. A square ruling on the rec-
ognition of the foreign marriage would come only in a
case of direct attack. 5 The Court cited the Harrison
case as authority for the Maryland rule that uncle and
niece marriages were only voidable and so was able to
work it that the local law making power had not decided
to deny all validity to such marriages. Thus, by using
the analogy between the internal law problem of total
voidness or voidability and the Conflict of Laws problem
of public policy, the Court was able to find that the gen-
eral rule, rather than the exception, applied.
"Further as indicating that the Fensterwald case meant to rule for the
complete validity of the marriage under the foreign law, consider that the
opinion, aupra note 14, 129 Md. 131, 134-7, went into detail in the matter of
the constitutionality of the Rhode Island law's permitting the marriage of
an uncle and niece of the Jewish faith, but not of others.
n1 "Supra note 3. While the marriage in question in that case was per-
formed in the District of Columbia, yet there was no Conflict of Laws
aspect, as the applicable law was the Maryland Marriage Act of 1777,
which had been adopted as the law of the District when it was separated
from Maryland.
26 The same result could have been reached in the Fensterwald case with-
out going into the Conflict of Laws problem by dismissing the case for
other reasons. The case was brought in an Equity court, after the death
of the husband, to have the marriage annulled. It could have been dis-
missed on any one of three theories: (1) That a third person has no stand-
ing to sue to annul a marriage, Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298, 29 Atl. 597,
25 L. R. A. 800 (1894) ; (2) That the marriage of uncle and niece, under
Maryland law, is only voidable by proceeding during the joint lifetime of
the spouses, Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison, supra note 3; or (3) That
a proceeding to annul a marriage between uncle and niece in Baltimore
City may only be brought in the Superior Court, and not in an Equity
court, Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra herein.
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As showing that the Maryland version of the excep-
tion for public policy more concerns Maryland as a forum
than as a state of domicil of the contracting parties"6
we must consider the Maryland rule that the validity of
an out of state marriage will not be defeated (short of
our rules of public policy) merely because the parties,
domiciled in Maryland, deliberately left Maryland in
order to evade our local marriage laws (as they did in the
Fensterwald case) so as to find a state permitting a mar-
riage here forbidden.27  While this is occasionally done
to evade our requirement of religious ceremony,2 it can
also serve to achieve marriage between persons related
by affinity in some of the locally prohibited relations.29
A matter now only of historical interest in internal
Maryland law, but still productive of Conflict of Laws
problems, is that of the prohibition of the re-marriage of
the guilty party to an absolute divorce.3 0 The Maryland
25 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 132, puts the exception to the gen-
eral rule in terms of the public policy of the domicil of the contracting'
party, although, in Sec. 134, it recognizes that a forum may, for some reason
of its policy as a forum, refuse to give a certain effect to a marriage other-
wise valid. The dictum in the Jackson case indicates that Maryland, as a
forum, will give no effect to a marriage violating its public policy, even
though it be valid both by the law of place of contracting and of the
domicil of the parties. For a treatment of the Maryland authorities under
the Restatement, see Reiblich, Maryland Annotations to the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (1937), Secs. 121-136. There is authority from without
the State that a state might recognize a marriage coming within the
public policy exception for some purposes but not for others. Thus, under
Whittington v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630,
Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1001, we might recognize the marriage of a Negro and
a white person, performed in a state sanctioning it, for the purpose of
transmission of property to the surviving spouse or children, although we
would not treat as lawful the cohabitation of the spouses under the mar-
riage in Maryland. See also, infra, note 86.
11 Jackson v. Jackson, supra note 19, 82 Md. 17, 29. See infra, notes 30
and 31 for cases involving the evasion of a prohibition against the remar-
riage of a guilty party to a divorce.
" Md. Code, Art. 27, See. 361, which formerly punished the act of leaving
the state to evade the marriage license laws, has been repealed by Md.
Acts 1927, Ch. 565.
2 Of the two remaining requirements as to which we would recognize
marriages not meeting our own standards, neither is such as to induce any
one to leave the state the more easily to get married. Our rules of age and
physical condition are as lax as those of any neighboring states. If the
voters at the 1938 election approve the statute, Md. Acts 1937, Ch. 91, which
provides for a 48 hour delay between the application for and issuance of a
marriage license, there may be provided an administrative obstacle to
hasty marriage which may motivate evasive marriages elsewhere, but
many other states have similar provisions.
1* For a brief period, Maryland had a statute empowering the Chancellor
to forbid the remarriage of the guilty party to an absolute divorce, Md.
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case of Dimpfel v. Wilson8l shows how the Conflict of
Laws problem can still arise. There the guilty party to
a New York divorce was, by the then applicable New
York- law, forbidden to re-marry. As the New York
courts interpreted the prohibition, it did not apply to
marriages performed outside of New York.8 2  The party
went to the District of Columbia and entered into a sec-
ond marriage, the validity of which was presented to the
Maryland Court. The Court upheld the validity of the
District of Columbia marriage primarily on the theory
that it was only voidable by appropriate proceeding in
the District, which had a statute making it a ground for
divorce that one of the parties was under such a disabil-
ity. The Court was thus able to work it that by the
law of place of performance it was only voidable at most
and so not subject to collateral attack in Maryland. This
is an example of how the Court uses the device of void-
ability as distinguished from total voidness to carry out
the judicial inclination to uphold marriage wherever
possible."
(2) Formalities."4
While the legal theory in Maryland is that marriage is
a civil contract yet, under Fornshill v. Murray35 and Deni-
son v. Deniso8 6 it can be entered into today 7 only through
Acts 1872, Ch. 272, repealed by Md. Acts 1888, Ch. 486. Elliott v. Elliott, 38
Md. 357 (1873), held this retroactive and constitutional. Garner v. Garner,
56 Md. 127 (1881), held it improper for the Chancellor to enter such an
order against a defendant who was not served with the process in the case.
See also 17 Op. A. G. 239 (1932).32 Supra note 11.
"I The Conflict of Laws problem would be more perplexing if either the
state of the divorce or of the forum interpreted the prohibition to have
extra-territorial effect.
as The question of the territorial jurisdiction of Maryland courts to annul
marriages where the parties are domiciled elsewhere or the marriage cere-
mony occurred outside Maryland is discussed at the very end of this article.
'This section is concerned only with the Maryland rules concerning
solemnization of marriage. Other types of formalities, permitted else-
where, were treated in the preceding section.35 Supra note 1, 1 BI. 479, 481-2. The later Denison case did not mention
Fornshill v. Murray.
8-35 Md. 361 (1872). Many other Maryland cases state the requirement
of religious ceremony, as Incidental to applying the presumption of mar-
riage from cohabitation and repute. These are referred to, infra note 52.
See also Cheseldine's Lessee v. Brewer, 1 H. & McH. 152 (1739), which
apparently recognized contractual marriage but which was distinguished
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a religious ceremony. Practically all other American states
permit some form of civil ceremony to accomplish marriage
and a few remaining ones still allow the so-called s8 "com-
mon law" or simple contract marriage, 9 once permitted in
almost all states. While the Denison case is the principal
source of our mandatory requirement of a religious cere-
mony, statutory provisions have worked it out who may
celebrate the ceremony required by that case, and have pro-
vided for exceptional situations. It is little likely that the
dearth of appellate law on who may celebrate marriage will
be remedied, since the case of Knapp v. Knapp"' decided
that, even if the celebrant lacked appropriate authority, if
the parties acted on the belief that he had it the marriage
is valid.
The question of what constitutes an appropriate re-
ligious ceremony to achieve marriage was presented to the
Court of Appeals in Feehley v. Feehley"' There a Cath-
olic couple were married and then divorced. Each had at
least one subsequent marital experience which also term-
inated. They decided to inter-marry again and a priest
was called to effectuate their wishes. No license was pro-
cured. The priest proceeded, as he testified, to "bless their
reunion," as he considered them already married to each
other by virtue of the original marriage. The question
whether this ceremony made them married was presented
to the Court and it was held that a valid marriage resulted.
From the Feehley and Knapp cases we must gather that no
in the Denison case on the grounds that the case was imperfectly reported,
came from a trial court, and that the real problem was that of proof bf
marriage by reputation. See also Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 46, 170
AtI. 733, 92 A. L. R. 1412 (1934).
8, Apparently Maryland once sanctioned marriage by civil, as well as by
religious ceremony. See the statutes cited in Fornshill v. Murray, supra
note 1, 1 BI. 479, 482; and Denison v. Denison, supra note 36, 35 Md. 3G1,
379.
" The Denison case found that the common law of England required a
religious ceremony, although most other American states have ruled that It
permitted simple contract marriage.
"1 See Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, supra note 20, recognizing a simple con-
tractual marriage under the applicable law.
,o Md. Code Supp., Art. 62, Sec. 4, See Md. Code, Art. 27, See. 359, mak-
ing criminal the act of an unauthorized person in performing the rites of
marriage. Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 364, makes it criminal to give any reward
to another for bringing persons to a Minister to be married.
-1 149 Md. 263, 131 AtL. 329 (1925).
"2 129 Md. 565, 99 AtI. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017 (1916).
221 •
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particular form of religious ceremony is essential under
Maryland law so long as it is a religious ceremony inci-
dental to the parties' own agreement to marry, conducted
by some one believed by the parties to be an appropriate of-
ficial to do so."s
Thus the theory of the religious ceremony as amarriage
requirement in Maryland is that the ceremony does not
make the parties married, but that the parties marry them-
selves by their contractual offer and acceptance." The re-
ligious ceremony merely provides the legally required
formal background for the contract-as would a seal, or
paper and ink serve for contracts which must be sealed or
in writing.
Our local requirement of religious ceremony raises some
complicated problems of peculiar types of marriages. What
of proxy marriages, marriage by telephone with the minister
in Maryland and "on the wire," marriage at sea by the
master of a vessel whose home port is Baltimore, and mar-
riages by mail? None of these difficult problems has yet
been ruled on by our Court.
Proxy marriages5 (where the proxy appears at a Mary-
land ceremony) and telephone marriages are of dubious
validity under the policy of the religious ceremony, both
from the standpoint of having certain evidence of actual
contract and that of requiring a solemn act as a sure indica-
tion of marital intention. Is a shipmaster ex officio the spirit-
ual adviser of the ship's company of souls, so that we may
count his marriage ceremony as religious and legally suf-
ficient?46 Marriages by mail between two points in Mary-
land are clearly invalid, as we do not sanction simple con-
tract marriage, but if the offer be despatched to, and the
Is Consider Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639, 142 Atl. 97 (1928),
treated infra under Intent, with reference to the marriage of a Jewish
couple by a Christian minister with an alleged agreement for a subsequent
ceremony by a Rabbi.
"On the civil nature of marriage, see 2 Alexander's British Statutes,
2nd ed., 1014.
,5 On proxy marriages, see Lorenzen, Marriage by Proamy and the Conflict
of Laws (1919), 32 Harv. L. Rev. 473; and Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 124.
"On marriages at sea, see (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 1129; and Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 127. See Baltimore Evening Sun, April 29, 1938, for
mention of such a marriage performed on- a ship of the Baltimore Mail
Line.
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acceptance be mailed from a jurisdiction permitting "com-
mon law" marriage, by usual Conflict of LaWs rules,47 a
valid marriage results, even though the offer was sent from
and the acceptance received in Maryland.
Maryland has a definite set of- rules concerning the issu-
ance and use of marriage licenses."8  The Feehley case4
9
held that the requirement of a license was only directory
and not mandatory so that if a proper religious ceremony
did occur without a license a valid marriage would, never-
theless, occur.' The result is that, while the parties and
celebrant will be guilty of crime for marrying without a li-
cense,49a the marriage itself is as valid as if one had been
procured. That the license requirement is directory, of
course, automatically solves any legal difficulties that might
arise from the use of an imperfect license, one improperly
secured, one procured from the wrong county seat,50 or one
not returned to the issuing clerk. These imperfections do
not matter, either.
While it is customary to have witnesses to a marriage,
there is no legal requirement of attesting or even present
witnesses for normal marriage ceremonies. Special provi-
' Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 125. See also (1919) 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 848.
"The Maryland marriage license rules are of administrative, rather than
legal significance. They are found in Md. Code and Md. Code Supp., Art.
62, Secs. 4-13, 16-17. They include provisions for th- form of the license,
for the Clerk to examine the applicant as to the competency of the parties,
for the keeping of records and the use of certified copies in evidence, for
the Clerk to refuse the license if he discovers an impediment, for reporting
marriages to the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, and for the keeping of
records of foreign marriages. State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237, 16 Ati. 529
(1889), involved the Clerk's accounting for license fees collected; and State
v. Floto, S1 Md. 600, 32 AtI, 315 (1895), was a case of perjury in the
application .for a license.
" Supra note 42, 129 Md. 565, 568. See also the trial court opinion of
Bond, J., in the Feehley case, 3 Bait. C. Rep. 439, which dealt extensively
with the question of the need for the license. See also Pontier v. State, 107
Md. 384, 391, 68 AtI. 1059 (1908), reflecting a similar rule with reference
to the New Jersey requirement of a marriage license.
"a On the criminal aspects of the marriage license laws, see: Md. Code,
Art. 27, Sec. 360 (criminal for parties to marry without a license) ; Md.
Code, Art. 27, Sec. 302, and Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 11 (criminal for min-
ister to perform marriage without a license); Md. Code, Art. 62, See. 13
(criminal for minister to fail to return the certificate to the Clerk) ; Md.
Code, Art. 27, Sec. 361, which formerly punished the act of leaving the
state to evade the license laws, has been repealed, supra note 28.
1* The license is only good In the county or city where issued, Md. Code
Supp., Art. 62, See. 4.
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sion for Quaker marriage before 12 witnesses is made, in
lieu of celebration by a religious official.5'
If the mandatory requirement of religious ceremony be
lacking, the marriage is totally void and may not be ratified.
However, this result is limited to extreme cases as a result
of the rules we have seen above, making authority of cele-
brant, special type of ceremony, and license immaterial.
Further, both the presumption of necessary ceremony from
cohabitation and repute and proof by declarations also aid
in making indirect proof of the mandatory ceremony."2 So
it is that the judicial bent toward upholding the marriage
flourishes in this area, almost as much as if it were possible
to hold the marriage either only voidable or capable of
ratification.
May an annulment (i. e., a declaratory judgment of total
voidness) be secured on the ground of no proper solemniza-
tion? The statutory annulment procedure does not cover
this impediment. Perhaps a divorce could be secured for
"marriage void ab initio"."1 The availability of the gen-
eral procedure for annulment in equity is doubtful unless
lack of formality be considered one of the "contract impedi-
ments" for which that annulment route is available.
(3) Competency of Parties.
Five elements enter into the question of competency or
the capacity of a person for becoming married. Legally
recognized objectionable aspects of the following five quali-
ties, which furnish the sub-divisions, may prove to be im-
pediments to a valid marriage: (A) Subsisting prior mar-
riage; (B) Relationship; (C) Race; (D) Age; and (E)
Physical condition.51
"1 See also Fensterwald v. Burke, supra note 14, which treated of the
Rhode Island statute recognizing the Jewish marriage ceremonies.
Is These propositions have been discussed and treated in some twenty-odd
Maryland cases, not to be cited here. For an excellent analysis of them
and of the whole problem indicated by the title, see Myerberg, Proof of
Marriage in Maryland (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 120.
s But, then it might be argued that a divorce suit may not be brought
without alleging and proving a marriage to have occurred.
5, Mental condition as an impediment to marriage is discussed infra
under Intention and Consent, Inasmuch as insanity appears either as an
impediment to capacity to contract or as a material fact the fraudulent
concealment of which might, in a strong enough case, work an actionable
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A. Subsisting Prior Marriage (Bigamy).
If, at the time of the marriage in question, one of the
parties was already married to another person under a
prior valid marriage which had not been dissolved by death,
absolute divorce,55 or annulment, the later marrriage is
totally void and may not be ratified. 6  The law of this im-
pediment is simple-prior marriage still existing makes
later one totally void. The difficult problem is to apply the
law to the facts. Was there in fact a prior marriage? Did
it continue until the time of the later marriage? By setting
up rules to govern the investigation of these two questions
the Maryland Court has carried forward its bent toward
favoring marriage and legitimacy, so that this impediment
is very hard to avail of on collateral attack save in most
extreme cases. This achieves almost the same result which
would follow from holding the marriage only voidable. For
that matter direct attack has been but little more success-
ful.57
Thus, on the first point, the Court refuses to apply the
normal presumption from cohabitation of the prior mar-
riage 's happening where there is shown a later ceremonial
marriage between one of the parties to the cohabitation
and a third person. The theory is that the presumption of
fraud on the other party. Another beading which would appear at this
point, were it not obsolete, is that for Civil Status. At one time special
rules governed the capacity of slaves to marry. See infra notes 82 and 95.
" The problem of the prohibition of the re-marriage of the guilty party
to an absolute divorce (now obsolete in Maryland) was discussed supra
under Conflict of Laws.
"Although most such marriages involve the crime of bigamy, the mar-
riage will still be civilly void even though, for some reason of the crim-
inal law, guilt of that crime is not imposed. Thus, for instance, it is not
imposed if the impediment spouse had, at the time of the later marriage,
been absent and unheard of for seven years. Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 23, as
amended, Md. Acts 1937, Ch. 142. On the crime of bigamy see also Barber
v. State, 50 Md. 161 (1878) : and Pontier v. State, supra note 49.
5 In LeBrun v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 496 (1881), the Court refused such an
annulment for lack of sufficiently clear proof that the first husband was
alive at the time of the second marriage under attack. In Ewald v.
Ewald, 167 Md. 594, 175 Atl. 464 (1934), the husband sought an annulment
on the ground that his wife's divorce from her former husband had been
secured on a false showing of Jurisdictional facts. The Court held it too
late thus to attack the divorce. In Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra note 25,
granting the annulment was avoided by the device of holding that a third
person (the inipediment spouse himself) had no standing In court to seek to
annul a marriage, even if it could be shown to be bigamous.
58 Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144, 157-9 (1876) ; and Jones v. Jones, 48 Md.
391, 30 Am. Rep. 466 (1878).
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innocence of bigamy in the later marriage overcomes the
presumption of former marriage otherwise raised by the
cohabitation.'
Further to make proof of the impediment first marriage
difficult, the Court, in Bowman v. Little,"0 indicated that the
fact of a later marriage would require unusually strict
direct proof of a former impediment marriage of one of the
spouses. In the Bowman case the Court found to be un-
persuasive certain evidence of the former marriage which
was of unusual weight, and adhered to a rule that, were it
to be followed in all cases regardless of later marriage,
would make direct proof of marriage almost impossible.
6 1
Then, even if the first marriage's occurrence has been
sufficiently proved, there still remains a judicial device to
avoid applying the instant impediment. This is the pre-
sumption, recognized in Schaffer v. Richardson, 2 that the
impediment spouse died, or a divorce was secured, in the
interval between the two marriages. This presumption is
probably more often impossible to rebut than otherwise in
collateral attack cases. It happened that, in Bowman v.
Little, the presumption could have been too easily rebut-
ted," and so, to reach the end of upholding the second mar-
riage and the legitimacy of its offspring, the case had to be
put on the more dubious point of insufficient proof of the
first marriage. In the normal situation, disproof of the
" This same presumption of innocence of bigamy underlies the require-
ment of direct, not presumptive proof of the impediment first marriage
when a prosecution for bigamy because of the later ceremonial marriage is
brought. Distinguish O'Leary v. Lawrence, 138 Md. 147, 113 AM. 63S
(1921), where the problem was whether to presume a ceremonial mar-
riage when the only proof was of successive .cohabitations with two dif-
ferent men. Consider also the other cases cited, infra, note 66.
*0101 Md. 273, 61 AtI. 223, 657, 1084 (1905). Compare Boone v. Purnell,
28 Md. 607, 630, 92 Am. Dec. 713 (1868), where the Court said the evidence
of the impediment marriage did not amount to "strict proof," and Red-
grave v. Redgrave, supra note 19, 38 Md. 93, 98-102, where the Court also
found the Impediment marriage insufficiently proven.
61 Consider Fornshill v. Murray, aupra note 1, 1 BI. 479, 480-1, 485, where,
on sufficient proof of the impediment marriage and the spouse's survivor-
ship, two later marriages were held void.
62 125 Md. 88, 93 Atl. 391 (1915). See also Hensel v. Smith, 152 Md. 380,
390, 136 AtI. 900 (1927); ,Mitchell v. Frederick, aupra note 86, 162 Md. 42,
46; and LeBrun v. LeBrun, aupra note 57, 55 Md. 496, 503-4. Contrast
Fornshlll v. Murray, supra note 1, referred to aupra note 61, where there
was no mention of presumed divorce.
el On the facts it would have been possible to trace the. acts of both
spouses so as to prove the non-happening of a divorce.
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presumed divorce requires proof of a negative, which is
particularly difficult when the one who was twice married
had disappeared during .the interval between the marriages
and could, somewhere during that interval, have secured a
divorce.
The statement above that marriages subject to this de-
fect are totally void and may not be ratified poses the
question of the status of the two parties to the defective
second marriage after the impediment first spouse dies or
a divorce is secured. Cohabitation after such time is not
allowed of itself to serve as a ratification.6 ,
But the question arises: Why should not such subse-
quent cohabitation create the normal presumption of a valid
ceremony performed after impediment removed? The
statement in Barnum v. Barnum65 that no presumption of
marriage arises from a cohabitation shown to have been
illicit in its inception would seem to answer the question in
the negative, although it must be remembered that later
cases6" have indicated that, even after a cohabitation illicitly
commenced, indirect proof may suffice to prove that a mar-
riage later occurred. It would seem more consistent with
the judicial inclination to uphold'marriage and legitimacy
to presume a necessary ceremonial marriage from cohabi-
tation after impediment removed, or even to allow subse-
quent cohabitation to serve as an outright ratification. With
respect to the former proposition, it must be remembered
that the Court has stated "6a that the rule of presumed con-
tinuance of an illicit relation only applies when "there is no
impediment to marriage." From that it might be taken
that the refusal to presume a marriage from cohabitation
only applies to a cohabitation which is illicit for lack of
solemnization, and not to a situation where there is the
impediment of bigamy later removed.
6 Mitchell v. Frederick, supra note 36, 166 Md. 42, 46; and a dictum in
Jones v. Jones, supra note 4, 36 Md. 447, 455-6.
65 Supra note 19, 42 Md. 251, 296-7.
"Jones v. Jones, supra note 58, 45 Md. 144, 155-6; Jackson v. Jackson,
supra note 19, 80 Md. 176, 192-3. Contrast O'Leary v. Lawrence, supra
note 59, where the desire to hold a child legitimate apparently outweighed
the illicit nature of the cohabitation.
16a Jones v. Jones, supra note 58, 45 Md. 144, 155; and O'Leary v. Law-
rence, supra note 59, 138 Md. 147, 152.
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Under what procedure may one obtain, by way of annul-
ment, a judicial declaration of the total voidness of a
bigamous marriage? The statutory procedure (which pro-
vides both for a civil petition and criminal prosecution) is
especially set up for this and the following impediment. It
is an open question whether provision for this impediment
in the statutory procedure precludes obtaining a divorce
therefor on the theory of marriage void ab initio 7 The
Ridgely case"s seems to imply that the setting up of the
statutory procedure was meant to preclude the general
equity type of annulment for this defect.
B. Relationship.
Blood relations forbidden to inter-marry include brother
and sister, parent and child, grand-parent and grand-child,
uncle and niece, and aunt and nephew. Of the affinity rela-
tionships of both the "in-law" and "step" kinds, it is for-
bidden for a person to marry his or her spouse's parent,
grand-parent, child69 or grand-child; or to marry the spouse
of his or her parent, grand-parent, child, or grand-child."0
There is no prohibition of the marriage of first cousins,
of step-sister and step-brother, nor of brother-in-law and
sister-in-law. There has been no ruling whether adoptive
relationships come within the prohibited degrees, although
by analogy to the prohibition of affinity relationships, it
might seem they would. Relationships of the half-blood have
been held to come within the enumerated degrees by a ruling
" The trial court opinion in Darling v. Darling, Daily Record, December
27, 1937, mentioned, but did not decide this point. The Court held it Im-
proper to attempt to annul a bigamous marriage by a bill in equity under
the general equitable method, as, in Baltimore City, the proper court is the
Superior Court, Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 14. With reference to using the
divorce method, the Court intimated that, in the particular case, it would
have been futile to have attempted this by amending to a bill for divorce
on the ground of marriage void ab initio, as the bigamy was not proven.
A statement in Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra note 25, 79 Md. 298, 305, 308-9,
gives the impression that the divorce method may not be used, but it may
have been referring only to annulments, as such. The Court said that the
statutory method was " . . . the only source from which any Court in
Maryland derives the power to pass such a sentence or judgment for that
cause .. ..
" Supra note 25, and, as discussed, supra note 67.
" See, for an amusing interpretation of the similar prohibition of mar-
riages to relations by affinity, Back v. Back, 148 Iowa 223, 125 N. W. 1009,
L. R. A. 1916C, 752, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1025 (1910).
70 Md. Code, Art. 62, Sees. 1, 2.
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of the Attorney General in the case of half-uncle and half-
niece.71
Factual proof of the impediment of forbidden relation-
ship being obviously free from normal difficulty, the major
question hereunder would seem to be whether the too-close
relationship of the parties makes the marriage totally void
or only voidable. This problem has been presented in Mary-
land in Harrison v. State." It so happens that in this case,
the only one of relationship under local law yet to be
reported in Maryland, the relationship involved was the
least obnoxious of the prohibited blood relationships, i. e.,
uncle and niece. As yet there has been no ruling on the
prohibited affinity relationships, although it may probably
be assumed that all of these are no more obnoxious than the
least obnoxious of the blood relationships, and so come under
the rule therefor. The conclusion the Court reached in the
Harrison case, after considerable research into the Common
and Ecclesiastical laws, was that the statute meant to make
marriages of uncle and niece in Maryland only voidable and
not totally void. Fensterwald v. Burk,7 in one aspect, at
least reached the same conclusion, although it probably went
even further and recognized the complete validity of such a
marriage under the law of the place of performance, which
permitted it.
The plain word "void 74 in the statute and the criminal
penalties"5 both for the marriage and for sexual relations
cast doubt on the judicial conclusion that uncle and niece
marriages are only voidable, but other factors indicate that
it was not unreasonable to rule this way. These latter in-
clude the facts that a severer criminal penalty is provided
for marriages of brother and sister and those in direct line
71 Paradoxically enough, there is less common blood, and so less danger
from "inbreeding" in the case of half-uncle and half-niece, than there is in
the permitted marriage of first cousins.
7 Supra note 3.
"Supra note 14.
"Md. Code, Art. 6Z Sec. 1.
Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 314 (the Incest statute, which punishes sexual
relations between those related by cousangu ,ity who are prohibited to
marry) ; Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 355 (punishes the act of marrying within
three degrees of direct, and one of collateral relationship by consanguinity) ;
Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 356 (punishes the act of marrying within the other
prohibited relationships) ; Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 857 (punishes a minister
for marrying persons within any of the prohibited relationships).
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than is the case for the other prohibited degrees," that uncle
and niece marriages performed prior to 1860 were expressly
validated in the prohibitory statute,"' that the uncle and
niece situatikn is on the periphery of the prohibited blood
degrees and approaches the less obnoxious prohibited affinity
relationships, and finally, the judicial inclination to uphold
marriage whenever possible in order to secure legitimacy.
One could, of course, criticise the decision by comparison
to the dictum in Jackson v. Jackson78 to the effect that mar-
riages of negroes and whites, contrary to our statute, are so
void that they cannot even be recognized when they were
performed in a state permitting them. The statute there,
like the one for uncle and niece, uses the word "void ' 7' and
provides criminal penalties. One gets the definite impres-
sion, by contrasting the two cases, that the Court has in the
miscegenation instance so twisted the word "void" that it
means more totally void than usual, and subject to the Con-
flict of Laws exception, while in the uncle and niece situation
it has twisted it in the other direction to make it mean less
void than usual, i. e., only voidable by proceeding.
What of the total voidness or voidability of marriages of
brother and sister, parent and child, grand-parent and
grand-child? For the purposes of the Conflict of Laws
situation, these forbidden marriages are classed with the
inter-racial ones and are said 0 to violate our strong public
policy so that even their possible complete validity by the
law of the place of performance would not be recognized.
If, as the Court indicated in the Fensterwald case, total
voidness for purposes of internal law should be determined
by the same standards as for the public policy exception to
the usual conflicts rule, these marriages would then by our
view be totally void, whether performed in a state sanction-
70 This assumes that the first degree of collateral consanguinity referred
to in Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 355, includes only brother and sister. The
punishment for such marriages is a fifteen hundred dollar fine or banish-
ment from the state, while that for the less obnoxious marriages is only a
five hundred dollar fine.
17 Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 3.7
1 Supra note 19, 82 Md. 17, 29-30.
79 Md. Code Supp., Art 27, See. 365. To be sure, this says "forever pro-
hibited and void" rather than merely "void" but the difference seems
unimportant.80 Jackson v. Jackson, supra note 19, 82 Md. 17, 29.
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ing them, or in Maryland. But the language of the Har-
rison case is broad enough to declare for the mere void-
ability even of these marriages, whether performed in Mary-
land or elsewhere. The points set out above as making
plausible the actual decision on the facts of the Harrison
case would, however, justify distinguishing between the two
groups of forbidden'relationships.
What procedures may be used for avoiding, or declaring
the invalidity of marriages defective for relationship ? The
statutory procedure is especially provided for this ground.
To the extent to which these marriages are only voidable,
the divorce ground of "void ab initio" would seem to be
unavailable (assuming that the latter means "totally
void"). Provision of the statutory procedure precludes the
use of the general equitable method.8 1
C. Race (Miscegenation).s2
White persons and Malayans are forbidden to inter-
marry and both are forbidden to marry Negroes or persons
of Negro descent to the third generation.8 The statutory
mode of expression to cover persons of mixed white and
Negro blood is an awkward one and makes doubtful just
what proportion of Negro blood will disqualify one from
marrying a pure white person or Malayan. It is suggested
that if the person in question has some non-Negro blood and
that if all of his parents and grand-parents also had some,
he is eligible for purposes of the statute, even though he is
predominantly Negro. 4
Is a marriage which is definitely under the statutory ban
totally void or only voidable? While no Maryland case has
ever dealt directly with either the prohibition generally or
the specific problem, a strong dictum in Jackson v. Jacksont5
S1 upra notes 67 and 68.
8See Butler v. Boarman, 1 H. & McH. 371 (1770), concerning statutes
passed about the status of white women who married Negro slaves. Fur-
ther as to slave marriages, see Jones v. Jones, supra note 4, and Jones v.
Jones, supra note 58, 45 Md. 144, 159. Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 15, ratified
the marriage of colored people occurring before 1867.
"Md. Code Iupp., Art 27, Sec. 365.
8, This assumes that "to the third generation" involves counting the per-
son in question himself as the first generation. Otherwise the text state-
ment should include great-grandparents.15 Supra note 19, 82 Md. 17, 30.
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has indicated that such a marriage, forbidden by our statute,
is so totally void that it cannot be recognized even when
performed in a state sanctioning such marriages. As has
been suggested, this should also determine the issue of total
voidness or voidability for the purpose of internal law.
This is particularly so in view of the fact that the Jackson
case dictum put this type of marriage under the part of the
exception to the conflicts rule for those marriages which
"the local law making power has declared shall not have
any validity., 8 6
Granting such marriages to be totally void, what pro-
cedures are available for directly declaring that quality.
The statutory procedure does not apply. No doubt, a
divorce on the ground of marriage void ab initio could be
procured. It is doubtful that an annulment under the gen-
eral equity practice could be secured. A successful crim-
inal prosecution for entering into the unlawful marriage 7
(if the ceremony occurred in Maryland) or for illicit cohabi-
tation s in Maryland under such an invalid marriage might
accomplish the result of a judicial declaration of nullity,
even though this does not come under the statutory method,
which makes specific mention of criminal prosecution as an
annulment device.
s The application of this public policy exception makes legalized polygamy
possible. Thus if a white man marries a Negress in a Northern state per-
mitting it and keeps her there, and later comes to Maryland and marries a
white woman and keeps her here, he may divide his time between his two
wives and, in each state, will be regarded as lawfully married to the local
woman and may not be prosecuted for any crime connected with his marital
adventures. On this see Long, Domestic Relations, Third Edition, Sec. 86.
See, however, supra, note 26, concerning the possibility that, following
authority from without the State, Maryland might recognize an inter-
racial marriage, valid where performed, for limited purposes other than
that of sanctioning the cohabitation of thd spouses within Maryland.
Should such a doctrine be applied to the situation outlined above, Mary-
land might recognize the New York marriage for purposes of incapacitating
the man from entering into a subsequent ceremony in Maryland, with
the result that such ceremony would be criminally bigamous.8
' The marriage is criminal under Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Sec. 365, and
the minister is punishable under Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 358.
88 There is apparently no criminal punishment for a single act of sexual
Intercourse between persons of different races prohibited to marry, but if
such persons live together continuously under a void marriage they can be
prosecuted for the common law crime of illicit cohabitation. Then, too, a
white woman who "shall suffer or permit herself to be got with child by a
negro or mulatto" is punishable under Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 415.
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D. Age.
For lack of any Maryland case on the impediment of
non-age, and for lack of any local statute definitely changing
the common law rule,"9 it must be assumed that the latter
rule prevails today on this point. Thus, if one of the parties
is under the age of 7, the marriage is totally void. If the
male is over the age of 14 and the female over the age of
12 (the "ages of consent") the marriage is completely valid.
As to marriages between 7 and 12 or 14, the common law
rule was that they were inchoate or imperfect, subject to
ratification ° when the immature person reached the "age of
consent" and capable of disaffirmance by private act, with-
out the need for judicial proceeding, by either the immature
or (if one was above age) the mature person.
This poses the question whether such marriages, where
one of the parties is between 7 and the age of consent, are
to be classed as totally void but subject to ratification, or as
voidable only but by private act without need for judicial
proceeding. This would be of importance in the event that
one of the parties died or married a third person before
either ratification at age or positive disaffirmance at any
time had occurred, and the question came up on collateral
attack. There is no Maryland decision about it. Judge
Harlan's Maryland syllabus91 on the subject seems to clas-
sify such marriages as totally void but subj. ct to ratifica-
tion, so that on such collateral attack the marriage would be
held not to exist. The Ohio minority rule is to this effect.
9 2
The weight of authority under the common law rule, on the
other hand, seems to favor mere voidability so that it would
seem, on such. collateral attack, that the decision should be
in favor of the martiage.
What is the effect of the Maryland statute"' which re-
quires consent of parents or guardian before a marriage
8 On the common law rule, see Long, Domestic Relations, Third Edition,
See. 27.
90 For a reference to the ratification problem, see Jones v. Jones, supra
note 4, 36 Md. 447, 456.
91 Harlan, op. cit. supra note 5, 20.
92 Shafher v. State, 20 Ohio 1 (1851).
a Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 7. Distinguish the older statute which pun-
ishes a minister for marrying a male under 21 or a female under 16 with-
out parental consent, Md. Code, Art. 27, See. 363.
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license shall issue if either the female be under the age of
18 or the male under 21? If a couple, one of whom is under
the stated age, are married, either without any license, or
under a license obtained by perjury as to age, forged con-
sent, or connivance of issuing clerk, is the marriage valid or
defective? Although no Maryland case has squarely ruled
on it, the legal understanding is (lay belief to the contrary)
that such a marriage (if the parties are above 12 and 14) is
completely valid and may neither directly nor collaterally
be attacked for non-age. The parties, the clerk, the minister
may be guilty of crimes" in connection with the forbidden
marriage, but despite this the marriage is valid, 5 inasmuch
as the requirement of parental consent is only directory and
not mandatory. This would seem to follow from the Feehley
case"6 which held the general license requirement only direc-
'tory. If a marriage without any license can be valid, so,
too, should one under a license which ought not to have been
procured. The implications of the Corder case97 would also
support the conclusion, for there the annulment was
granted, not for non-age, but for fraudulent representa-
tions, although the parties were under 18 and 21 and paren-
tal consent was lacking.9 8 The same conclusion was indi-
cated by a dictum in the dissenting opinion in the recent
Lurz case.99
Despite the rule that such marriages are completely
valid, it is understood that trial courts in Maryland do occa-
sionally grant annulments in cases where the principal or
only impediment factor is the lack of consent by parents to
the marriage of a child under 18 or 21. Two things may
explain this apparent discrepancy between the book-law and
the practice. One is that possibly many of these cases are
1' I. e., for perjury, for malfeasance In office, or for the minister's marry-
ing without parental consent, under the statute cited supra note 93.
o5 For an analogy, see Jones v. Jones, supra note 58, 45 Md. 144, 159, to
the effect that the (now obsolete) crime of a minister's marrying slaves
without the master's consent did not render the marriage void.
11 Supra note 42.
:7 Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 Atl. 119 (1922).
'g In Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md. 200, 122 Atl. 357 (1923), both the
parties were under the ages for parental consent, but no mention of the
impediment of non-age was made. The case was successfully brought for
"fraud and deceit" on the basis of intoxication.
1, Supra note 5, 170 Md. 428, 432, 435, discussed in (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev.
348, 353-4.
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uncontested and the Chancellors grant the annulments be-
cause they seem for the best interests of the parties, al-
though, were the cases appealed, the decrees would not stand
up. The other is that the Corde.r case pointed the way to
obtaining annulments in plausible fashion through the de-
vice of alleging a fraudulent mis-representation of some
material fact, in addition to the lack of parental consent,
which is itself not operative for an annulment. In fact, in
that case, one of the two misrepresentations successfully
relied on was to the effect that the parties were old enough
to get married in Maryland without parental consent.
What procedure is available for annulling such a mar-
riage as can legally be annulled for non-age? Neither the
statutory nor the divorce procedure is available. It is ques-
tionable whether the general equitable procedure may be
used (unless this be counted a "contract impediment"),
although that could be used in cases similar to the Corder
case if allegations of some fraud are added to those of the
lack of parental consent. Possibly there is no procedure for
non-age alone, but this would not be intolerable inasmuch as
this type of voidability may be availed of by private act.
E. Physical Condition (Impotence).
While some other states have come around to imposing
certain requirements, such as a physical examination, or a
Wassermann test, or have prohibited the marriage of per-
sons afflicted in certain ways, Maryland has not, as yet,
adopted any of these measures. The only requirement of
physical condition which the law of Maryland imposes for a
valid marriage is that the parties must be capable, at the
time of the marriage, of normal sexual intercourse. While
in the common law system generally effect is usually given
to this requirement by making impotence a ground for
annulment, under the Maryland law it is a ground for
absolute divorce.1"
100 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended Md. Acts 1937, Ch. 396. The
principal Maryland case on Impotence is J. G. v. H. G., 33 Md. 401, 3 Am.
Rep. 183 (1870). See also Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 AtI. 605 (1936),
a case in which alimony was sought for the Impotence of the husband, but
was denied on the ground that the marriage had already terminated
through an Arkansas divorce secured by the wife. See also a dictum In
Corrie's case, supra note 18, 2 BI. 488, 490.
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The impotence, to be actionable, must exist at the time
of the marriage and must be permanent and incurable." 1
There must be distinguished the wilful refusal of inter-
course by a spouse capable thereof, which under Maryland
law will constitute abandonment and entitle to an abso-
lute divorce after three years.102 Impotence must also be
distinguished from sterility0" (incapacity to procreate or to
bear children, although there exists capacity for intercourse)
which, of itself, is no legal impediment to the marriage, al-
though the fraudulent concealment of known sterility (as
for other physical defects) might, in a strong enough given
case, be held to work an actionable fraud.
Both under the general view and the peculiar Maryland
version of the doctrine (divorce ground) the conclusion is
that impotence renders a marriage only voidable by pro-
ceeding and that the only local proceeding available there-
for is a suit for divorce a vinculo. The statutory proceeding
for annulment has no mention of this ground and it is
extremely doubtful that a general equitable proceeding for
annulment would lie.10
(4) Intention and Consent (The Contract
Impediments).
Even when locally appropriate conduct is engaged in by
competent parties, the marriage relation does not result
unless, further, the parties intended matrimony and freely
and understandingly consented thereto. If there be lacking
101 Important problems in suing for divorce for impotence are those of
proof and corroboration. See, on the rule of triennial cohabitation, that
failure to consummate the marriage after three years is presumptive proof
of impotence, Tompkins v. Tompkins, 92 N. J. Eq. 113, 111 Atl. 599 (1920).
102 Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 110 Atl. 889 (1920) ; Ruckle v. Ruckle,
141 Md. 207, 118 Atil. 472 (1922).
103 Impotence is defined in J. G. v. H. G., supra note 101, 33 Md. 401,
405-6: " .. . it is well settled that if by reason of malformation or or-
ganic defect existing at the time of the marriage, there cannot be natu-
ral and perfect coition, vera copula, between the parties; and it ap-
pears that the defect is permanent and incurable; the case comes with-
in the legal definition of impotence ... "
'" This suggests the inquiry why a plaintiff would prefer to litigate
impotence by a general bill in equity rather than by one for divorce.
Religious distaste for the name "divorce" might be one reason. To avoid
waiting until a two year residence had been acquired might be an-
other. The requirement of corroboration in "divorce" cases might be
still another.
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actual intention to become married to the particular person,
or if through mental defect or intoxication there was no
capacity to consent, or if the apparent consent was obtained
through fraud or duress, no completely valid marriage re-
sults. Thus the ensuing sub-divisions of this section are:
(A) Intention; (B) Insanity; (C) Intoxication; (D) Fraud;
and, (E) Duress. These might be called the "contract im-
pediments". 105
Because, with minor exceptions, the same answers are to
be given for all five of these problems, and so as to avoid
unnecessary duplication, there will first be discussed for the
five jointly whether the defects make marriages totally void
or voidable, and the appropriate procedure for annulling
marriages thus defective.
To reach a conclusion whether these various "contract
impediments" render a marriage "otally void or only void-
able (and if the latter, whether by proceeding or private
act) is not an easy task. There is almost a complete dearth
of Maryland authority"' and, at the same time, disagree-
ment among the writers and the persuasive precedents as to
the common law generally.07 There is a specific Maryland
ruling.0 . (later to be discussed in detail) that insanity affect-
ing contractual capacity renders the marriage totally void
if the lunatic be under certain types of adjudication but
only voidable otherwise.
The conclusion here advanced is that all these defective
marriages are at most only voidable by proceeding during
the joint lifetime of the spouses, save for the case of insan-
ity of one under adjudication and, possibly, such a complete
10" They are called "contract impediments" because of the statements
to be found in Maryland cases, infra note 164, that the jurisdiction
of equity to annul therefor depends on the inherent jurisdiction of
equity courts over contracts.1 0 The statement in Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra note 25, 79 Md. 298,
307, seems to contemplate voidability by the reference to the need for
"prompt application." This statement is cited in Owings v. Owings,
141 Md. 416, 421, 118 Atl. 858 (1922). See also the dissenting opinion in
Lurz v. Lurz, supra note 5, 170 Md. 428, 432.
107 See, for instance, Harlan, op. cit. supra note 5, 9-10, 14., classify-
ing them as void but capable of ratification, and Long, Domestic Rela-
tions, Third Edition, Sec. 16, classifying them as voidable by private
act.
100 Ewing v. Moore, 1836, referred to in 2 Alexander's British Stat-
utes, Second Edition, 1014. This was unreported and no opinion was
filed by the Court.
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lack of marital intention as really involves no marriage
ceremony ever intended to be performed. This latter would
include situations where none of the parties or others pres-
ent (as in a marriage rehearsal or in a play) considered the
external conduct as accomplishing marriage (apparent lack
of intent); and also fraud in the esse contractus, where one
of the parties had no intent at all. On the other hand, this
leaves as only voidable those marriages where the defect is
secret lack of marital intention, including mistake; insanity
without complete adjudication; intoxication; fraud in the
procurement; and duress. Five considerations support the
conclusion that these marriages are only voidable.
The first is the discernible judicial inclination to uphold
marriage and legitimacy wherever possible. This has al-
ready been seen not only to cause specific holdings of "void-
able" but to appear in various other ways of present
interest.
The second is the analogy to these specific holdings of
"voidable" for certain other impediments. Are the mar-
riages outlined immediately above any more desirable of
being held totally void than one between uncle and niece 110'
Would not insanity without adjudication go even more to
the essence of the marriage contract than the other contract
impediments set out? If the marriage of one under a pro-
hibition of his remarriage after divorce is only voidable, 110
so too should be those under discussion.
The third consideration is the possibility of ratification,
which exists for all these defective marriages."' The usual
rule is that a marriage capable of ratification is only void-
able, and vice versa, and that a totally void marriage may
not be ratified."' Thus it is that the writer disagrees with
the classification of "neither strictly void nor strictly void-
able, but totally void unless ratified" for these marriages.
10" Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison, supra note 3.
110 Dimpfel v. Wilson, supra note 11.
" Owings v. Owings, supra, note 106, 141 Md. 416, 421, a case which
was factually one of duress. although the allegation was of lack of
mental capacity. The Court in discussing the possibility of ratification,
treated the marriage as "voidable." See also Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra
note 25, 79 Md. 298, 307-8.
12 In Maryland, one exception to this is the case of uncle and niece
marriages under the Harrison case, supra note 3.
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The existence of such a class for these marriages is sup-
ported neither by Maryland cases nor the general weight of
authority."
8
The fourth consideration involves whether these impedi-
ments may be availed of equally by both spouses. Grave
doubt exists, in the law generally, whether this is so, par-
ticularly with regard to whether the sane or sober spouse
may sue to annul (or attack collaterally) a marriage so
tainted. The possibility of ratification by the other would
seem to indicate that he could not. Clearly the spouse
guilty of the fraud or duress could not assert it."' To the
extent to which these grounds are "one-sided", further
weight is given to the conclusion that they render the mar-
riages only voidable. If totally void, either spouse, or even
a third person (on collateral attack) could assert the defect.
The fifth factor is the expedient argument that the
nature of the impediments is such that it is desirable to have
the evidence adjudicated at as early a date as is possible and
thus during the joint lifetime of the spouses, in a direct
proceeding. The evidence bearing on these contract impedi-
ments is so likely to be confusing and conflicting that it is
much more desirable than otherwise that it be adjudicated
while it is still fresh. Annulment proceedings exist for this
purpose.
This last proposition brings into focus the question
whether, if these marriages be merely voidable and are not
totally void, the avoiding may be accomplished by private
act of disaffirmance or must be done by judicial proceeding
to annul. 5 The analogy to the law of contracts, which is
what makes these matters impediments to marriage at all,
would seem to permit of the former. But even then it must
be remembered that the law of contracts has not always
permitted the party thus entitled to disaffirm to do so by
'", The Harrison case, aupra note 3, 22 Md. 468, 489, stated the ex-
istence of such a class, but without reference to any particular type
of marriage. It is submitted that the class of "totally void but subject
to ratification" is confused with "voidable by private act" which is.
clearly the situation for marriages between the age of 7 and the 12-14
"ages of consent."1 1 Ridgely v.-Ridgely, supra note 25, 79 Md. 298, 307-8; Whitehurst v.
Whitehurst, supra note 20, 156 Md. 610, 619.
"I See supra note 111.
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private act for all such impediments and thereby to resist
enforcement of the contract. The rule once was that equity
alone could handle fraud in the inducement of a sealed con-
tract."6 Marriage is certainly as formal and dignified a
contract as is one under seal. Then, too, it must be remem-
bered, that while marriage is a contract, it may not be
rescinded by mutual agreement, as for other contracts.
That we force the parties to go into court to bring the con-
tract to an end for supervenient grounds should indicate
that we should also force them to go into court to take
advantage of the privilege of rescission for the pre-venient
grounds which provide the contract impediments.
The proper procedure for annulling a marriage affected
by one of the contract impediments is by a bill in equity
under the general equity practice. The statutory annul-
ment procedure is inapplicable, by its own limitations. The
divorce procedure is also inapplicable, unless these grounds
shall be held to make marriages totally void, or unless "void
ab initio" shall be interpreted to include "merely voidable."
A. Intention.
Marriage, like any express contract, requires that the
operative conduct be committed with intention to be bound.
Thus, even if competent persons engage in appropriate
conduct, unless both really intend matrimony, no valid
marriage results.
The Maryland Court, by entertaining two cases thereon,
has impliedly recognized the possibility that actual lack of
marital intention may defeat a marriage with appropriate
ceremony, although, in both cases, it found sufficient inten-
tion to be present in fact. In Brooke v. Brooke,"" the hus-
band, prior to the marriage had declared to the wife-to-be:
"I will marry you, but understand I will never live with
you." The Court held that this did not negative sufficient
marital intention, particularly as he did, subsequently, co-
habit with the wife and later became the father of one or
11 12 R. C. L. 408.
11v 60 Md. 524 (1883). Accord, Wimbrough v. Wimbrougb, 125 Md. 619,
29, 94 Atl. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916, U, 920 (1915).
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more of her children. This both served to ratify, if there
were no intention, and, as well as circumstantial proof that
he did entertain the necessary intention at the time of the
marriage. It would seem that, even aside from the subse-
quent conduct, the decision in theBrooke case would be
correct. His statement prior to the marriage did not show
the absence of any marital intent, but the absence of intent
to consummate, which latter event is not necessary to the
legal validity of a marriage. _
The Brooke case does suggest the problem whether a
secret intention not to have sexual relations after marriage
would avail the other party to the marriage as a ground for
annulment. While it is doubtful that it would, under the
Brooke case, count as lack of marital intention, still it might
be held, in a strong enough case, to work a fraud on the
other party entitling to an annulment therefor. For that
matter after three years of wilful refusal to consummate,
the other party could obtain an absolute divorce for aban-
donment.118
The other Maryland case is Samuelson v. Samuelson,'9
where (the sponses being of the Jewish faith) the plaintiff
alleged that the marriage, before a Christian minister, was
regarded by both as merely the engagement contract, con-
templated to be followed by a ceremony before a Rabbi
(which had never happened) which was to be the true mar-
riage ceremony. The defendant denied any such agreement
and the Court found that none existed although it intimated
that even if it had been proved the annulment would not
have been granted.
From the two cases we can gather the rule to be that
where the parties go through a normal marriage ceremony
(believed by the celebrating minister to be such) sufficient
marital intention will be presumed and a secret lack of
marital intention, while possibly operative in a sufficiently
strong case, will be most difficult to prove.120.
118 Supra note 102.
S upra note 43.
130 See Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, supra note 20, 156 Md. 610, 619, point-
Ing out that a secret lack of marital Intent would not avail that spouse if
the other spouse believed marriage was contemplated.
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The problem of mistake arises in this category, although
there are no Maryland rulings on it. 12 1  If a sufficiently
strong case of mistake should be judicially deemed to en-
title to annulment, it would be on the theory that the mis-
taken party never entertained a real marital intention to
contract with the party mistakenly dealt with or that fraud
procured the apparent consent.
If the parties go through the external marriage cere-
mony under circumstances when neither of them nor the
apparently celebrating official considers that the marriage
is intended, probably the "marriage" is totally void. This
would seem to follow with respect to marriages in a play or
pageant, or a rehearsal of a marriage intended to follow
regularly later. Marriages in jest, or to deceive a third
party present more difficult and as yet unsolved problems
in Maryland.
B. Insanity.12
The Maryland case of Elfont v. Elfont122 decided that if,
at the time of the marriage, one of the parties, from mental
defect, was "unable to understand the nature of the con-
tract of marriage and to appreciate the legal consequences
naturally deducible therefrom" the marriage is invalid.
The difficult question, of course, is to apply this test to the
facts and that was the main problem in the Elfont case,
which found that the husband was sufficiently sane to meet
the test, and so the annulment was refused.
An English statute"4 applicable in Maryland declares
"null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever" the
"I Other than the dictum in Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 266-7, 117 Atl.
114, 22 A. L. R. 810 (1922), with reference to mistake as to the person;
and, with reference to mistake as to the ceremony, the extract from the
dissenting opinion in Lurz v. Lurz, supra note 5, 170 Md. 428, 432,
434: "His statement that he did not understand what the ceremony was is
wholly inconsistent with his statement that he was induced to go through
it by threats of imprisonment."
"I See Yake v. Yake, 170 Md. 75, 183 Atl. 555 (1936), a case involving an
annulment for insanity, but with no law thereof involved. See also Forns-
hill v. Murray, supra note 1, 1 BI. 479, 481; and Corrie's Case, supra note
18, 2 BI. 488, 490.
118 161 Md. 458, 157 AtI. 741 (1931). The same test with reference to
intoxication was stated in Montgomery v. U'Nertle, supra note 98, 143 Md.
200, 207. See also Owings v. Owings, supra note 106, a case factually one
of duress where it was alleged that, from violence, plaintiff was uncon-
scious of what he was doing and was incapable of contracting.
12' 15 Geo. 2, Cap. 30, 2 Alexander's British Statutes (2nd Ed.) 1014.
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marriages of all "Lunaticks" who are under certain named
types of adjudication. These include adjudication by an
Inquisition under a Commission under the Great Seal of
Great Britain, and Parliamentary commitment of both per-
son and estate to the care and custody of particular trus-
tees. Assuming that these are analogous, respectively, to
the Maryland sheriff's jury adjudication, and to any judicial
commitment of both person and property to trustees, the
statute would then apply to these latter. The unreported
Maryland case of Ewing v. Moore.25 held that lunatic mar-
riages other than those specifically enumerated in the
statute were voidable only. Apparently then, under the
statute, the fact of the existence of the specified types of
adjudication is conclusive of lack of capacity to understand
marriage, and the marriage of such a lunatic may not even
be ratified in a lucid interval, so long as the adjudication
remains in force.
1 26
On the other hand, if the party in question, though in-
competent to comprehend the ceremony in fact, is not under
any such specified forms of adjudication, the marriage is,
at worst, only voidable, and may be ratified by cohabitation
thereunder in a lucid interval. 27 The statute did not apply
(and was not mentioned) in the Elfont case, because the
only adjudication was a Veteran's Guardianship proceed-
ing which was neither a sheriff's jury case nor a complete
adjudication both of person and property. It is perfectly
plausible, of course, that one may be incompetent to handle
his property, and still have sufficient mental capacity to
comprehend the significance of the marriage ceremony. In
the law generally there are different standards of mental
incompetency for different purposes. One rule applies to
marriages and contracts, another to capacity to make a will,
still another to capacity to testify as a witness,128 another to
1"I Supra note 108.
126 On this see the note, 2 Alexander's British Statutes (2nd Ed.) 1014-
1015.
112 On ratification, see Jones v. Jones, 8upra note 4. 36 Md. 447, 456.
125 Weeks v. State, 126 Md. 223, 227, 94 Atl. 774 (1915), held the witness
sane enough to testify, although she was the prosecutrix in a case of carnal
abuse of a mental defective and so, allegedly, was not sane enough to con-
sent to intercourse.
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capacity to entertain a criminal intent, and so on with exam-
ples too numerous to mention.
C. Intoxication.
The nominal test for intoxication as an impediment to
marriage is the same as that for insanity, i. e., whether the
spouse was too drunk to understand the nature of the con-
tract of marriage and to appreciate the legal consequences.
As for insanity, the difficult question is the fact one whether
the party in question was that drunk at the time of the
ceremony. This was the problem in the sole Maryland case
of Montgomery v. U'Nertle.29' There, on conflicting testi-
mony, the court found that the plaintiff-husband was suffi-
ciently drunk that he could not comprehend the ceremony,
and so awarded the annulment, finding also in his favor on
the conflicting testimony whether the marriage was ratified
by cohabitation in a sober interval. In the U'Nertle case
the court suggested"'0 that, had there been pre-marital rela-
tions (as is the rule for fraud and duress) stronger proof
would be necessary of the alleged grounds for annulment.
D. Fraud.
If a sufficiently strong case is made out that a spouse's
consent to the marriage ceremony was induced by a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation as to or concealment of a fact
material to the marriage relation, the marriage is at least
voidable by proceeding on the theory of fraud in the pro-
curement. Total voidness would probably result if the fraud
practiced amounted to fraud in the esse contratus.5 1
It is simple enough to state the rule-the difficulty lies
in its application and in ascertaining what facts are so
material to the marriage that their misrepresentation or
concealment will constitute an actionable fraud. Of the
three reported Maryland cases involving fraud, standing
in Supra note 98. While the case was factually one of intoxication, the
case was brought on the theory of "fraud and deceit."220 Supra note 98, 143 Md. 200, 206.
l1 Only cases factually involving fraud will be treated in this section.
Cases involving other impediments, although mentioning fraud, are treated
elsewhere where they properly belong. Others, merely stating the source of
the power of Equity courts'to annul marriage for fraud are collected, infra,
note 164.
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alone and uncomplicated by intoxication or duress, two are
apparently liberal in favor of the annulment, and one is
stricter and denies it.
In-Brown v. Scott182 the annulment was granted on the
following facts: Plaintiff wife was school-girl of good fam-
ily. Defendant was an older man, an ex-convict and repro-
bate, who falsely represented himself as of good family, a
former Harvard student, a wounded war veteran, and a
secret-service man. Swayed by these representations,
plaintiff married him. He was shortly thereafter convicted
of crime and, at the time of the case, was in a penitentiary.
The Court of Appeals found that a sufficiently strong case
of fraud was shown for annulment. The Court emphasized
the extreme youth of the plaintiff and intimated that an
older woman, who should more easily have been on guard
against such deception, might not so readily have been
awarded an annulment for the fraud.
In Corder v. Corder 8 misrepresentations as to past
personal history, among others, were present. There, de-
fendant husband, then chauffeur for the girl's father, after
unsuccessfully attempting her seduction, induced her to go
from her home in Pennsylvania into Maryland to be mar-
ried, on the combined false representations, first, that his
past life had been above reproach, and, second, that they
were old enough by Maryland law to obtain a license with-
out parental consent. The Court found this a sufficiently
strong case of fraud and granted the annulment.
It is interesting to note the emphasis there on the mis-
representation as to the Maryland marriage license law.
Usually, misrepresentations as to matters of law are held
not actionable frauds, either civilly or criminally.' 4 But the
Lurz case.85 (primarily one of duress) also recognized that
the defendant's falsely persuading plaintiff that a criminal
prosecution can be brought may constitute actionable fraud
and/or duress, although threats of lawful prosecution will
not.
112 Supra note 121.
2" Supra note 97.
... 12 R. C. L. 295 (civil) ; and State v. Edwards, 178 Minn. 446, 227 N.
W. 495, 65 A. L. R. 1258 (1929) (criminal).
"I' Supra note 5.
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From the Brown v. Scott and Corder cases we must take
it that the Maryland Court is liberal in granting annulments
because of fraud as to prior misconduct of the defendant.
Oswald v. Oswald,' on the other hand, indicates a stricter
view of another type of allegedly material fact. There the
defendant wife, who had a living divorced former husband,
induced the plaintiff husband, a devout Roman Catholic, to
marry her on her false representation that her former hus-
band was dead. On discovering that she was a divorced
woman he ceased living with her and sought an annulment
for the misrepresentation of what, to him and those of his
belief, was a very material fact. The Court denied the
annulment.
While this was an unhappy case for the Court to have to
decide, yet the decision is, all things considered, probably
correct. In the first place, the religious disbelief in divorce
that made this misrepresentation material to plaintiff was
one squarely at variance with the law's chosen step of grant-
ing divorces. In the second place, the only thing that could
make the type of fact misrepresented material to any large
number of people (without which it could hardly be objec-
tively material) was that it was a belief held by members of
a particular sect. But for the law to give ear to the wishes
of a particular sect would itself be improper and violative
of the separation of Church and State. By the same token
which made the point material at all, the law had to ignore
it.181
Other types of fraud occasionally presented elsewhere
have not arisen in our Court. The problem of the wife's
misrepresentation as to or concealment of her prior unchas-
tity (which might be held a species of fraud) is locally dealt
with by our a vinculo divorce statute... which makes the
wife's pre-marital unchastity a ground for absolute divorce.
This probably precludes the possibility of obtention of an
annulment therefor on the ground of fraud even should this
86 146 Md. 313, 126 At. 81 (1924).
137 See for a somewhat similar case of the unfortunate clash between the
lgal and religious views of marriage, Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 150
N. E. 605, 44 A. L. R. 714 (1926).
... Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended, Md. Acts 1937, CI. 396.
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be held an actionable fraud." ' If the pre-marital unchastity
was known to the husband at the time of the marriage,4 0 or
should have been known to him because of his own relations
with her,14' he cannot obtain the divorce. The analogy to
the fraud cases holds on this point.
Whether a husband can obtain an annulment for fraud
when the wife induces him to marry by falsely alleging
pregnancy to have resulted from their illicit relations is an
unsettled question in Maryland law, '42 although it is doubtful
that he may, in view of the rule of high burden of proof
when pre-marital relations have occurred.
1 4 8
It was previously suggested that a sufficiently strong
case of misrepresentation as to or concealment of prior in-
sanity, or sterility (as distinguished from impotency), or
other physical defect might be held to work an actionable
fraud. Cases of alleged misrepresentation of age have
arisen in the trial courts. It would seem that if age is mate-
rial at all the problem is more one of impotence or of fraudu-
lent concealment of sterility, to be handled under such
names.
144
Not only has the Court indicated that pre-marital rela-
tions make the burden of proving fraud very difficult to sus-
tain, but, conversely, in the Corder case" it was suggested
that, if the marriage was not consummated, 46 weaker proof
of fraud than otherwise would be actionable. Regardless
U in Hoff v. Hoff, 162 Md. 248, 251, 159 AtI. 591, 82 A. L. I. 528 (1932),
doubt was expressed that this would be an actionable fraud in the absence
of statute.
, Wlegand v. Wiegand, 155 Md. 643, 645-7, 142 Atl. 188 (1928) (husband
must be corroborated as to his lack of knowledge) ; and Hebb v. Hebb, 135
Md. 697, 111 Atl. 240 (1919) (husband has burden of showing both his
ignorance of the fact and the absence of any facts to put him on guard).
1"1 Hoff v. Hoff, supra note 139.
,2 Ibid, 162 Md. 248, 251, expresses doubt that the fraud would be action-
able even in this case.
'" A leading case from without the State on this point is DiLorenzo v.
DiLorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63, 63 L. R. A. 92, 95 Am. St. Rep. 609
(1903), where the representation was that the defendant had given birth
to a child by the plaintiff.
1" Quaere Is there any difference between misrepresentation and con-
cealment in Maryland marriage law.
145 Supra note 97, 141 Md. 114, 120. In Brown v. Scott, &upra note 121,
140 Md. 259, 268, 270, it was suggested that the annulment would not as
readily be granted if children had been born of the marriage.
I" Distinguish, of course, marital relations with knowledge of the fraud,
which constitute a ratification.
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whether the fact of consummation 147 is or should be legally
operative in annulment cases, it is inescapable that it is one
of the "secret equities" which may affect findings on the
facts. The emphasis on it is a manifestation of the judicial
inclination to uphold marriage, as for that matter is the rule
of difficult burden of proof if pre-marital relations have
occurred.
E. Duress.
Actionable coercion, compulsion, or duress prevents that
free exercise of the will which is necessary to an express
contract, including that of marriage. Investigation of the
matter of duress vel non is complicated by the rule (recog-
nized for fraud and intoxication as well) that, where pre-
marital relations have occurred, the burden of proving the
duress is extremely difficult to sustain. 4 ' Put into homelier
language, the rule might be stated: "Where the parties
ought to be married, they stay married !" Pre-marital rela-
tions had occurred in each of the three reported Maryland
cases on duress, and, no doubt, such will have happened in
the great majority of duress cases that will arise.
The earlier Wimbrough"9 and Owings'50 cases were
somewhat similar in that both involved pre-marital rela-
tions and conflicting evidence of the extent of the induce-
ments offered by the defendant-wife's relatives to persuade
the plaintiff to become a bridegroom. In each case, both
because of the conflict of the testimony and the extra-high
burden of proof, the Court was able to deny the annulment
for insufficient proof of actionable duress.
,, In this connection consider a dispatch in the Baltimore Sunday Sun,
March 20, 1938, about the unearthing in Leningrad of a Czarist decree
annulling a marriage because of the lack of consent by the groom's father
which decree also expressly declared that the bride should be considered a
virgin. No doubt such a point would be considered a non-justiciable ques-
tion in Maryland law and entirely without the scope of the prayer for
general relief in equity.
148 Wimbrough v. Wimbrough, eupra note 117, 125 Md. 619, 622-3; Owings
v. Owings, supra note 106, 141 Md. 416, 420; Montgomery v. U'Nertle, supra
note 98, 143 Md. 200, 206.S49 upra note 117.
150 Supra note 106. The plaintiff alleged physical violence rendering him
mentally incapable, rather than fear of harm. The Court held this not
proven and also held he had ratified by voluntary cohabitation after the
ceremony.
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The most recent case of Lurz v. Lurz,1 5 while apparently
more favorable to the annulment for duress, came up on de-
murrer and was never prosecuted to a decision on the
merits. There the plaintiff-husband alleged both his imma-
turity and that the defendant threatened him with arrest for
the non-support of the (as yet unborn) child and so fraudu-
lently persuaded him he could be arrested and induced him
to marry against his will. The Court held plaintiff's bill
sufficient to require an answer, although it was indicated
that the pre-marital relations would impose the very high
burden of proof. The case emphasized that a threat of law-
ful criminal prosecution (as for bastardy) would not be an
actionable duress, although a threat of an unlawful or an
impossible one would be. The division in the Court was as
to the tenor of defendant's alleged threats in this regard.
If, for lack of pre-marital relations, the normal burden
of proof applies, or if the abnormal one can be met, the rule
seems to be that the duress, to be actionable, "must exist
at the time of the actual ceremony, so as to disable the one
interested from acting as a free agent, and protest must be
made at that time." 52 This dictum would indicate that it is
rather difficult ever to obtain an annulment for duress.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF ANNULMENT AND
SIMILAR PROCEEDINGS.
Assuming now that a given marriage is either totally
void or voidable, what are the various procedures available
to declare its total voidness or accomplish its avoiding.
There will be discussed in turn the three definite types of
annulment proceedings provided in Maryland. These are the
statutory method, the divorce method, and the general equity
method. Then, under the heading of "miscellaneous meth-
ods" there will be an inquiry whether any other procedures
are available in Maryland for obtaining declaratory judg-
ments about the validity of a marriage, along with a dis-
cussion of the general question of who may sue to annul.
151 Supra note 5.
18' Owings v. Owings, supra note 106, 141 Md. 416, 419.
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Finally will be a treatment of territorial jurisdiction to
annul.15
A. The Statutory Method.
For the two impediments of prior subsisting marriage
(bigamy), and prohibited relationship (incest), a Maryland
statute1 " provides a special annulment method. On the
civil side of the courts, provision is made for the filing of
a petition by one of the parties in either the Superior Court
of Baltimore City or the Circuit Court of one of the counties.
Recognition is also given by the statute that successful crim-
inal prosecutions for the named types of defective marriages
will also serve to annul them.
The reference to the Superior Court of Baltimore is an
historical anomaly, explained by the fact that, when the
statute was passed, that court had Equity powers later
taken away without a correlative change in the statute. In
the counties the same court has both law and equity powers,
so that the only problem there is how and where to docket
a petition under the statute. Civil proceedings under the
statute simulate the equity practice because it is provided
that the testimony shall go into the appellate record and be
considered de novo by the Court of Appeals. 55
A difficult problem posed by the statute is whether it is
exclusive in the field of annulment. While it does not pre-
vent the exercise of the divorce method for the specific
grounds that method covers, or the use of the general equity
power to annul for the contract impediments, a more per-
plexing matter is whether it precludes using the other meth-
ods for the two grounds enumerated in the statute. It
would seem " that it does so preclude using the general
equity method for them, but it remains to be decided whether
a marriage which is totally void for bigamy may be also at-
tacked by a suit for absolute divorce on the theory of "void
ab initio ' .157
159 See Miller v. Miller, 159 Md. 204, 150 Ati. 451 (1930), on the effect of
denial of annulment as res adjudicata of the validity of the marriage.
215 Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 14.
... This would apply only to proceedings on the civil side under the
statute, for the Maryland rule is that criminal cases may not be appealed
on the evidence.




B. The Divorce Method.
The setting up of the three Maryland pre-venient
grounds for absolute divorce15 8 (impotence, pre-marital un-
chastity of the wife, marriage "void ab initio") substan-
tially accomplishes the granting of annulments in the name
of divorce. For the first two named,159 this method is prob-
ably the exclusive method of annulment. As the third
ground, marriage void ab initio, has never been ruled on,16°
many questions remain open under it, such as those of
legitimacy, alimony,"' and whether other annulment meth-
ods are available in the alternative.
Another point is whether marriages which are voidable
only may be attacked under this procedure. The answer
is probably not, particularly as a statement in the Harrison
case,162 made for another purpose, treated "totally void"
and "void ab initio" as synonymous.'63 Thus, if this ground
is ever interpreted, we may receive further rulings on what
impediments make for total voidness, rather than mere void-
ability.
C. The General Equity Method.
The inherent power of courts of Equity over contracts
and their reformation and rescission for defects concerned
with intention and consent has been held.' to confer juris-
diction on Maryland Equity courts to annul marriages for
the "contract impediments" despite the lack of mention of
151 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended Md. Acts 1937, Ch. 396.
159 On these, see the treatment above, circa notes 1004 (impotence) ; and
notes 138-143 (pre-marital unchastity).
160 It was mentioned In LeBrun v. LeBrun, supra note 57, 55 Md. 496,
502-3. See also Dimpfel v. Wilson, supra note 11, 107 Md. 329, 334, refer-
ring to the District of Columbia pre-venient divorce statute.
161 Yake v. Yake, supra note 122, held that no alimony could be awarded
in an annulment suit. See Staub v. Staub, supra note 100, where alimony
was sought for impotence, but denied on the ground that the marriage rela-
tion had already terminated.
102 Supra note 3, 22 Md. 468, 485.
103 See Stewart and Carey, A Digest of the Law of Husband and Wife as
Established in Maryland (1881) 13, n. 12, suggesting that voidable mar-
riages should also come under the divorce ground.
10, Fornshill v. Murray, supra note 1; LeBrun v. LeBrun, supra note 57;
Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra note 25; Wimbrough v. Wimbrough, supra note
117; Corder v. Corder, supra note 97; Brown v. Scott, supra note 121; Os-
wald v. Oswald, supra note 136.
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such impediments in the statute setting up an annulment
procedure for bigamy and incest.
The question is: What grounds thus come within the
inherent power of courts of Equity over contracts? It has
already been suggested that bigamy and incest, impotence
and pre-marital unchastity are excluded, respectively, be-
cause already provided for in the statutory and divorce
methods. The early cases recognizing the inherent Equity
power, stated it to be a power to deal with fraud and duress
affecting contracts. The Court has since entertained, with-
out discussion of the point, cases involving intent, insanity,
and intoxication.165 But what of the remaining impedi-
ments: Lack of solemnization, miscegenation, and age?
Are these, too," contract impediments" so as to come within
this general equity method? Lack of solemnization and
miscegenation probably could be litigated under the divorce
method, as making the marriage void ab initio, as could a
marriage where one party was under the age of 7. Possibly
that method was meant to be exclusive for those impedi-
ments. But what of the marriage of one between 7 and the
12-14 ages of consent, which is only voidable? Is there any
method for it? Possibly a method is unnecessary, inasmuch
as this is the one type of voidability which may be accom-
plished by private act.
D. Miscellaneous Methods.
In exploring the question whether there exist any addi-
tional local methods for obtaining a direct adjudication de-
claring the total voidness of a marriage.6 6 two collateral
questions appear and will influence the whole discussion.
One is whether a third person may sue to annul a marriage
allegedly defective, and the other is whether there exists any
procedure, available either to the spouses or a third person,
for petitioning to have the marriage declared valid, rather
than invalid, which latter is the objective of the typical an-
165 Samuelson v. Samuelson, supra note 43 (intent); lfont v. Elfont,
supra note 123 (insanity) ; Montgomery v. U'Nertle, aupra note 98 (intoxi-
cation).
... The problem is that of further procedures for obtaining declaratory
Judgments of complete validity or total voidness, as sufficient procedures for
avoiding voidable marriages already exist.
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nulment methods. Discussion can best be built around the
leading Maryland case of Ridgely v. Ridgely.67
In that case Mrs. Ridgely left Maryland and went to
South Dakota where she obtained a divorce from Mr. Ridge-
ly which was of questionable validity because of the doubtful
nature of her necessary domicil in South Dakota. She sub-
sequently married one Hyatt. Mr. Ridgely, not accepting
the South Dakota divorce, brought a suit in Maryland
against her, asking that the court annul her marriage to
Hyatt on the ground that the South Dakota divorce was void
and she was still married to Ridgely. The Court dismissed
Mr. Ridgely's bill on the ground that he was not a party
to the marriage sought to be annulled and so had no stand-
ing in court to seek an annulment.' The Court pointed out
that an annulment could be sought for such a ground (big-
amy) by the statutory method and that the statute itself
limited actions on the civil side thereunder to petitions filed
by one of he parties to the marriage. The Court implied
that could the case have been brought under the general
equity method, a third person might have some standing to
prosecute the annulment. It is doubtful, however, that this
suggestion will stand up, for it is hard to see how a third
person has any standing to attack a contract generally for
one of the contract impediments. Particularly when we re-
member that the contract impediments to marriage are such
that the injured party may ratify the marriage, and that it
is doubtful that the other party may himself seek to annul
even if not ratified, it is hard to see how any third party
would have any standing in a court of Equity to attack a
marriage which is thus voidable. Of course, a third party
would have no standing under the divorce method. Thus
we may say that annulment suits under the three basic meth-
ods set out above may be brought only by one of the spouses
167 Supra note 25.
"I Fensterwald v. Burke, supra note 14, involved an attempt by a third
person, after the death of one spouse, to bring a direct proceeding to annul
the marriage. As the court found the marriage valid in law and fact, it
was unnecessary to take up the point of the capacity of a third person to
sue to annul.
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(or a type of representative appropriate for suits gener-
ally) .16
But the question is, is there any other type of proceed-'
ing by-which a third person can obtain an immediate direct
ruling on the invalidity of a given marriage, or whereby one
may ask for a ruling in favor of his own marriage ? If we
visualize that Mr. Ridgely probably wanted an immediate
declaratory ruling that he was still married to Mrs. Ridgely,
against the day when her possible predecease might entitle
him to claim a widower's property rights, let us see what
else a plaintiff in his position could have done to obtain
that, when he was denied the use of any of the three normal
annulment methods.
Even under the statutory method itself, such a plaintiff
might have had the wife prosecuted criminally for bigamy,
if the second ceremony had occurred in Maryland or for
cohabitation here if otherwise. But criminal prosecutions
do not start themselves. Many officials must be persuaded
to act before one is successfully concluded. Even without
the mention of it in the statute, a criminal prosecution would
serve to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity."' In addi-
tion to those affected by bigamy and incest, inter-racial mar-
riages are the only ones... for which criminal prosecutions
might so serve. 7'
To achieve his assumed desire, such a plaintiff could try
certain other methods that substantially involve collateral
attack, but which would be of such a deliberate nature as to
approach direct attack. He could sue the wife for absolute
1
"There has been no ruling in Maryland on the capacity of a parent on
behalf of an infant, or a guardian on behalf of an insane person, to seek to
annul a marriage against the wishes of the substantial plaintiff. This
point was suggested in the Elfont case, supra note 123, but did not have to
be decided, as the court found Elfont sane enough to have entered into the
marriage. Suffice it to say that if the annulment is denied, there is no
problem, and if it is granted, implicit in its granting is a finding that it is
for the best interests of the incompetent person to have the annulment.
... There might be some doubt whether a criminal conviction would be
res adjudicata of the validity of the marriage in a different, civil case.
Perhaps the express mention of criminal convictions in Md. Code, Art. 62,
Sec. 14, was meant to make such convictions res adjudicata.
.1 See supra notes 87 and 88 concerning the distinction between criminal
prosecutions for the ceremony and for cohabitation thereunder.
17 There are no criminal aspects directly involved in impotence and the
contract impediments, and the criminality involved in cases of non-age and
improper solemnization does not affect the validity of the marriage.
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divorce for her allegedly adulterous cohabitation with the
second husband. But obtaining this would preclude him
from later claiming a widower's rights. He could sue for
partial divorce for desertion, and this, if obtained, might
be res adjudicata that she was still his wife and that the sus-
pected divorce was invalid. This would come as close as
anything to giving him his desired declaratory judgment in
favor of the continued validity of his marriage to her. He
might sue the second husband for alienation of affections
and/or criminal conversation. But how many of these,
years later perhaps, would serve as completely as an annul-
ment to counteract the presumption either of the validity of
the second marriage or of the preceding divorce, especially
when the witnesses of the circumstances of her residence in
the divorce granting state would long since have vanished.
Would any of our local procedures for preserving evi-
dence 73 against a future need for its use serve to accom-
plish what such a plaintiff would want? Until a ruling
otherwise, it can be said that it is doubtful. We have no
Declaratory Judgment statute at law and only a nominal
one in Equity."4 Both from its own content and the inter-
pretative cases, it is apparent that the latter can rarely be
used and not at all in this situation. Other states have such
statutes which are so used.
But the question remains: Should there not be made
available some procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment as to the validity of a marriage, whether it be desired
to attack or sustain it. The statutory annulment is prob-
ably not broad enough to permit a civil petition by one of
the spouses seeking to sustain, as well as to attack, the valid-
ity of a marriage possibly tainted by incest and bigamy."7
The divorce procedure, obviously, works only in the direc-
1?3 I. e., proceedings for the perpetuating of testimony and for taking
testimony de bene esse.
"I Md. Code, Art. 16. Sees. 28-34.
I"1 The first part of Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 14, authorizes the named
courts to "inquire into, hear and determine the validity of any marriage."
This might seem to authorize declaratory Judgments pro and con for anv
impediment. But the latter part of the same sentence: "and may declare
any marriage contrary to the table of this article, or any second marriage,
the first subsisting, null and void . . ." would seem to indicate that the
purpose of the statute was only to permit attacks on marriage for the two
named impediments.
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tion of attack. The general equity method probably works
the same way. Statutory reform of the situation could well
provide both for declaratory judgments in favor of mar-
riages and for codification of our present overlapping and
conflicting annulment procedures.
In favor of an extensive declaratory judgment practice
for marriages is the argument that if it is fair to allow mar-
riages to be directly attacked by various methods involving
mere declaratory judgments, it is equally fair to provide
means for the assurance of those who wish to rely on them.
So long as we do give spouses indefeasible claims in the
property of the other spouses upon death it should seem
fair to enable the evidence bearing on such claims to be
adjudicated while still fresh, as was apparently sought in
the Ridgely case. We would not have to retrogress as far
as the old English suit for the restitution of conjugal rights
in order to do justice in this regard.
But, as supporting the status quo, is the known judicial
inclination to favor marriage and legitimacy. The Ridgely
ase itself shows that if we should permit declaratory judg-
ments in favor of first marriages we may allow third per-
sons to attack later marriages which are functioning de.
facto. This would depart from the discernible judicial
trend toward favoring the later and normally functioning
marriage.
E. Territorial Jurisdiction to Annul.17
If an annulment proceeding is brought in the proper
Maryland court between parties both domiciled here, and
concerning a marriage performed in the State, no Conflict
of Laws problems arise. Complications arise when one or
both the spouses is domiciled elsewhere and/or the ceremony
was performed elsewhere. As has been pointed out in the
Maryland Annotations to the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, 7 the Court of Appeals has assiduously avoided17 1
'" On this point, see Myerberg, Juri8diction to Annul a Marriage, Daily
Record, August 4, 1931.
'" Reiblich, Maryland Annotations to the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws (1937), Se. 115.
178 The question has been raised in two Maryland cases. In Elfont v.
Elfont, supra note 123, 161 Md. 458, 474, the Court ruled that the territorial
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making a square ruling on this territorial jurisdiction point.
The decisions are consistent with the theory that Maryland
has jurisdiction either if the ceremony was performed
here,179 or if the parties are domiciled here at the time of
the proceeding,180 or even with the broader theory that per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties (aside from any other
factor) would support an annulment proceeding.181  Like-
wise, they are not inconsistent, necessarily, with the view
adopted by the Restatement"'2 that the state may annul a
marriage under the same jurisdictional circumstances as
would enable it to grant a divorce. However, in the absence
of an expressed opinion on the subject by the Court of Ap-
peals, we can only speculate as to the merits of the three
possible bases of jurisdiction.
The rule of jurisdiction based on domicil simulates that
for the granting of divorce and is the one approved by the
Restatement. It may be taken that, so long as we grant
divorces where.only one spouse is domiciled here and where
both marriage and misconduct occurred elsewhere,ls we
would also grant annulments on the same basis.'" The
grounds for the annulment would be determined according
to the law of the state whose law determined the validity of
jurisdiction point, raised for the first time on appeal, was raised too late
to be considered. They also denied the annulment on the merits, so that
nothing was lost by their refusal to consider the other point. In Corder v.
Corder, sup-a note 97, 141 Md. 114, 117, the Court answered the plea to thejurisdiction by confusing it with a plea concerning the power of Equity to
grant annulments rather than one to the territorial jurisdiction of Mary-
land courts.
1,9 In the following cases the Court entertained annulment suits on the
merits where the ceremony had been performed In Maryland, although the
parties were domiciled elsewhere at the time of the suit: -Brown v. Scott.
supra note 121; Corder v. Corder, asupra note 97; Montgomery v. U'Nertle,
supra note 98.180 In the following cases the Court considered on the merits suits ,where
the ceremony was performed elsewhere, although the parties were here
domiciled at the time of the suit: Fensterwald v. Burke, supra note 14;
Oswald v. Oswald, supra note 136; Elfont v. Elfont, supra note 123.
11 Dicta in Corder v. Corder, spra note 97, 141 Md. 114, 117; and Elfont
v. Elfont, supra note 123, 161 Md. 458, 474.
182 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 'Section -115.18 8 Md. Code Supp., Art. 16, Sec. 37.
1, Quaere: If Plaintiff is'domiciled in Maryland, but Defendant is not,
what method is available for serving Defendant If personal service may not
be secured. Both the divorce and general equity methods already have
devices for service by publication. Would the same method be used, by
analogy, in the Superior Court of Baltimore City under tle statutory
method?
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the marriage, i. e., place of celebration, subject to our public
policy exception."'
The rule of jurisdiction based on ceremony in Maryland,
even though both parties are elsewhere domiciled at time of
suit, also seems plausible, for it would seem appropriate
to have the annulment suit recorded in the same county seat
as that where the marriage license record is located, and
conducted by the courts most familiar with the applicable
law and best situated to obtain all the evidence concerning
the facts surrounding the ceremony.
For that matter, taking jurisdiction solely on the basis
of both parties being before the Court, regardless of domicil
or place of ceremony, has a certain amount of plausibility.
There is not the same objection that there would be to al-
lowing a state to grant a divorce without domicil of at least
one party. Even if annulment jurisdiction is thus assumed,
the same decision will (presumably) be made as in the
courts of the state of domicil or ceremony, viz., one accord-
ing to the law of place of celebration. In divorce cases on
the other hand, the grounds are determined by the law of the
forum, and to allow the parties to choose their forum, with-
out regard to domiciliary considerations, would allow them
to choose states having easy divorce."8 6
Of course, if the annulment be sought by the divorce
method in Maryland, the jurisdictional rules appropriate
for divorce proceedings generally must be satisfied, and thus
residence of at least one of the spouses in Maryland would
be requisite,""1 and that for two years if the grounds oc-
curred without the state.' It is submitted that if the mar-
riage occurred outside the state, then the pre-venient
grounds of impotence and marriage void ab initio also oc-
curred outside. Pre-marital unchastity would probably be
determined according to the place where the act occurred.
Then, if the annulment be sought by criminal prosecution,
either under the statutory method or otherwise, such a
prosecution in Maryland would have to be predicated upon
188 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, See. 186.
188 To be sure, our public policy exception for inter-racial marriages might
lead to our annulling a marriage which would not be invalidated elsewhere.
's, Supra note 183.188 Md. Code, Art. 16, See. 40.
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some criminal conduct within Maryland, either the marriage
ceremony, or the local cohabitation under a ceremony per-
formed elsewhere.
There has been no case determining the circumstances
under which Maryland will recognize as valid an annulment
decree rendered in another state. Suffice it to say that we
should probably recognize one granted under circumstances
under which we, ourselves, would grant one. The full faith
and credit clause would compel recognition of many foreign
annulment decrees, and if, as indicated above, we would en-
tertain jurisdiction ourselves very freely, we should prob-
ably go even farther than required and recognize all of the
kind that we would grant."9
189 The text above analogizes the situation to that for divorces, for which
see Reiblich, Maryland Annotations to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
See. 113.
